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2002Carnegie Challenge
The Romans had a phrase for it: Silentleges inter arma. During warfare the lawsare silent.  We have seen the truth of
Cicero’s maxim during America’s past wars. It was
painfully evident to both sides during the Civil
War, and again when we were fighting enemies on
foreign shores during the two world wars. Now, as
we mobilize after September 11th to face the global
threat of terrorism, the strength and resiliency of
the U.S. Constitution will once again be put to the
test in light of such questions as: How do we pro-
tect our society from suicidal terrorists without
undermining the basic freedoms that this country
stands for, and without taking actions that later we
will regret? How do we meet the potential new
threat of attackers penetrating our borders and
inflicting even greater casualties if they turn to—
and succeed in acquiring—weapons of mass
destruction?  And how do our intelligence services
use new methods and technologies to keep terror-
ists from carrying out their plans in the future?
On the morning after the attacks on the World
Trade Center and the Pentagon, President George
W. Bush declared that the United States had
endured an act of war and was now, itself, in a
state of war against terrorism. Throughout the
nation there was deeply felt and widespread sup-
port for the president and for the course of action
he took in the days, weeks and months that fol-
lowed, which ranged from sending troops to root
out Al-Qaeda terrorists in Afghanistan to institut-
ing stringent and unprecedented security measures
throughout the American homeland.  While much
of that support remains strong, it is useful to note
that in past wars, such presidents as Abraham Lin-
coln, Woodrow Wilson and Franklin Roosevelt—
with equal conviction, if not always with equal
public accord—used their powers to protect and
defend the nation in ways that deeply troubled
civil libertarians at the time and still do, now,
across the years.  Outside of legalized slavery, the
mass internment of 120,000 Japanese immigrants
and their families in 1942—most, American-born
citizens—stands as one of the most egregious and
reviled breaches of liberty in U.S. history.  (For
other examples of clashes between American liber-
ties and national security concerns, see the Appen-
dix, page 11.)
President Bush’s remarks on September 12th in-
cluded the important warning that, “The American
people need to know that we’re facing a different
enemy than we have ever faced.”  He was referring,
of course, to the terrorist network that had insti-
gated and carried out the airplane attacks on the
World Trade Center and the Pentagon.  But his
characterization of the new foes of democracy can
easily be extended to cover more than foreign-born
fanatics fueled by religious fervor.  The danger is
domestic too, and has already come in the form of
a crew cut ex-GI, Timothy McVeigh, who perpe-
trated the worst previous terrorist attack on U.S.
soil, the April 1995 bombing of the Murrah Feder-
al Building in Oklahoma City that left 168 dead.
Terror has also made itself known by the hand of
Theodore Kaczynski, the Harvard-educated
Unabomber, who waged an 18-year tantrum
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against modernity before his brother turned him
in.  And it came in the mail, as deadly anthrax dis-
ease spores—though we have yet to determine if
the perpetrator of that terrorist campaign was
homegrown or not.
Clearly, terrorism in all its forms—those we have
experienced and those we can yet hardly imagine—
is a fact of 21st century life that we all must face.
“Terrorists,” said Robert F. Turner, professor of
international law and foreign policy at the Univer-
sity of Virginia and associate director of the Center
for National Security Law, addressing a recent
meeting at Carnegie Corporation of New York
held to explore issues relating to homeland security
and liberty, “are developing all sorts of nasty things
that can kill people by the hundreds of thousands
and perhaps millions.”  An even more dire warning
was issued three years ago by the U.S. Commission
on National Security/21st Century, co-chaired by
former U.S. Senator Gary Hart—also a participant
in the Corporation meeting.  The commission stat-
ed that: “America will become increasingly vulnera-
ble to hostile attack on our homeland, and our
military superiority will not entirely protect us...
States, terrorists, and other disaffected groups will
acquire weapons of mass destruction, and some
will use them. Americans will likely die on Ameri-
can soil, possibly in large numbers.”
Given these realities, Americans may have some
tough choices to make about what rights and pro-
tections they are willing to give up—or at least
compromise on—in order to allow for the imple-
mentation of security measures that may be not
only inconvenient and intrusive, but possibly even
threatening to the freedoms that we perceive as the
very foundations of our democratic society.  Is it
absolutely necessary, though, to make these choices
or are there ways in which we can find a balance
between our need to ensure the safety of our
nation and our desire to protect the liberties of its
citizens?  This paper will explore some of the ten-
sions inherent in that dilemma.
Surveillance of Means, Not Persons
By the time the second hijacked jet slammed into
the World Trade Center’s South Tower on Septem-
ber 11th, many Americans had begun to experience
the shared realization that terror had come to our
doorstep.  We could never again allow ourselves to
be as open and unguarded as obviously we were
that morning.  Our intelligence apparatus, our
immigration and border control, our airport securi-
ty—none had presented a strong enough defense
against a determined and committed enemy.  The
people involved in the attacks on the World Trade
Center and the Pentagon—as well as those who
commandeered the airplane that crashed in Penn-
sylvania—moved in and out of the country on stu-
dent or tourist visas, obtained drivers’ licenses and
credit cards, used library computers hooked to the
Internet to communicate with co-conspirators in
the Middle East and Afghanistan and learned the
rudiments of flying jet aircraft in U.S. flight
schools.  Once the methods they had employed to
enter the U.S., exploit the country’s resources and
travel around became clear, so did the feeling of
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most Americans that they had caught us with our
guard down.
Americans are accustomed to making sacrifices in
wartime, and it may be that we will have to sacri-
fice some privacy to ensure that we are not such
ready targets for the next group bent on mass mur-
der. Most understand the need for stringent securi-
ty checks at airports and generally have tolerated
with good humor the delays and minor indignities
that entails.  And they have overwhelmingly
endorsed many of the practical measures taken to
ensure the safety of travelers in the air, on mass
transit and on the roads, including the effective—
and perhaps also symbolic—strengthening of doors
to airplane cockpits, making them harder to force
open. That means the next team of suicide hijack-
ers, if there is one, will not find it so easy to seize
control of a jetliner’s controls in flight. Terrorists
no doubt will look for other targets of opportunity,
but they also may have to find means other than
crashing a jumbo jet into a building. (And perhaps
they already have, judging by the “shoe bomber”
incident involving suspected Al-Qaeda operative
Richard Reid.  “Few now think Reid was a
bungling amateur,” reported Time magazine in
February 2002.)
For Ashton B. Carter, a professor at Harvard’s
Kennedy School of Government and former assis-
tant secretary of defense for international security
policy under Bill Clinton—and also a participant
in the Carnegie Corporation forum on homeland
defense—what terrorists may do next and how to
deal with the possibilities leads to an important
distinction in the security choices that are available.
Carter, who, as the senior Pentagon official respon-
sible for international security policy from 1993 to
1996, spent considerable time worrying about how
to keep nuclear weapons and fissile materials from
falling into the hands of terrorists or “rogue states,”
says that while detection and prevention of terror-
ism certainly requires surveillance as a major strate-
gic component, the civil liberties implications of
surveillance of means and surveillance of persons need
to be considered and understood separately.
For law enforcement agencies, Carter argues, the
most important and do-able task is to improve sur-
veillance of the means that terrorists could use to
wreak destruction, such as tracking purchases of
chemicals, fertilizer and other raw components of
bombs or biological warfare or watching who is
trying to rent crop-dusting aircraft. Crop dusters
belatedly received scrutiny from authorities after it
was learned that one of the September 11th terror-
ists had made a preliminary inquiry about renting
one. But the FBI actually had crop dusters on their
watch list as early as the 1996 Olympics in Atlanta.
Police and the FBI are accustomed to searching for
guns and bombs—but not for the ingredients of
weapons of mass destruction. Carter stresses the
importance of authorities having up-to-date lists of
what to check for in an age of terrorism.
“We tend to think of surveillance as looking for
the perpetrators themselves,” he says.  “That’s
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tough to do.  It’s much easier to do surveillance of
means. And surveillance of means is something we
have not really begun yet. I’m not prepared to sur-
render any of my liberties,” he adds, “until we have
done a whole host of other things that can con-
tribute materially to the solution of this problem.”
Instant Checks for Credit, but Not 
for Terrorists
One surveillance tool we are all accustomed to
encountering is the ubiquitous video camera that
watches us at travel checkpoints, ATMs, malls and
the entrances to office buildings—but unless they
are being monitored in real time by watching eyes,
they are not particularly effective as a preventive
measure.  In most cases, cameras serve by compil-
ing a record that is useful to authorities in identify-
ing perpetrators after the deed is done—like the
infamous shot of Mohammad Atta and Abdulaziz
Alomari carrying their bags through security at the
airport in Portland, Maine, early on September
11th to catch a flight to Boston.
That doesn’t mean that video cameras aren’t help-
ful—or that security systems and personnel should
not be on the alert for suspected terrorists.  Indeed,
nine of the nineteen September 11th hijackers were
singled out for extra security screenings at airports
that morning, either by guards who saw something
that aroused suspicion or by computer programs
that waved a red flag. Some of the hijackers were
even on a terrorist watch list and should not have
been allowed into the country. But none of those
systems prevented the terrorists from getting on the
planes and going about their work.
John Shattuck, chief executive of the John F. Ken-
nedy Library and Foundation and former ambassa-
dor to the Czech Republic, offers this scenario:
“Imagine if Mohammad Atta had taken out a cred-
it card to pay for his ticket—as he did—and he’d
exceeded the card’s limit. He would have been 
denied the ticket. And yet we know that he was
already on the watch list developed by U.S. intelli-
gence agencies. Had that information been avail-
able to the airlines, they could have denied him
passage.” The credit card companies can tell an air-
line ticket agent instantly if someone is a bad credit
risk—but the government has no foolproof way of
flagging travelers who pose a threat to U.S. security.
One way of improving the government’s ability to
keep track of individuals with deadly intent has
been suggested by William A. Owens, former
admiral and vice chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs
of Staff who is now co-chief executive officer of
Teledesic, a satellite communications company, and
a trustee of Carnegie Corporation of New York.
He would like to see a “system of systems,” where
sensors and software would be linked together to
provide vital information across federal depart-
ments that could link in states and localities as
well.    In that way, he says, agencies such as the
U.S. Customs Service and the Immigration and
Naturalization Service “would have access to infor-
mation about border crossings, flight manifests and
lists of passengers traveling on airplanes.”  With
that kind of information quickly and reliably avail-
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able, much more could be done to deter potential
terrorists.
Two U.S. agencies that also need to break down
traditional barriers to cooperation—at least when it
comes to tracking terrorists—are the CIA and the
FBI. Traditionally, the FBI, with its domestic secu-
rity mission, and the CIA, charged with protecting
national security and gathering foreign intelligence,
have not worked closely together, and that’s how
our society wanted it.  But changing times and
events have blurred the edges of their separate mis-
sions: the FBI, for example, recognizing the global
nature of much crime and terrorism, has opened
offices in dozens of foreign capitals over the past
few years. And both FBI and CIA operatives had a
hand in helping Pakistani police capture Abu
Zubaida, the Al-Qaeda leader who had been func-
tioning as Osama bin Laden’s operations chief since
the terrorist leader has been on the run.
That’s not to say that cooperative efforts between
law enforcement agencies has become the norm.
Local law enforcement personnel often grouse
about the feds’ unwillingness to share information.
And the seemingly constant round of high security
alerts called by Homeland Security Director Tom
Ridge and Attorney General John Ashcroft in the
months after September 11th frustrated some gov-
ernors and police chiefs, who remained in the dark
about exactly what they were supposed to be on
high alert for, since that information was not pro-
vided to them.  “Livid” would probably be a better
word for how New York City officials felt when
they found out that this past October, the federal
government had received a tip that terrorists were
planning to detonate a small nuclear bomb in New
York City but didn’t notify the mayor, the governor
of the state, or local law enforcement.  Ridge later
explained that if the information—which turned
out to be false—had leaked, it would have caused
widespread panic, but many officials and citizens
alike felt that they should have been given the
option of how to respond.
A Commonsense Approach to 
Terrorism
In his 1998 book, Terrorism and America: A Com-
monsense Strategy for a Democratic Society (MIT
Press, 1998), Philip B. Heymann, the James Barr
Ames Professor of Law at the Harvard Law School
and former deputy attorney general, succinctly
conveyed his prescription for what democracies
need most in dealing with terrorism: common
sense. Looking at how Northern Ireland, Germany,
France and other countries dealt with terrorists
within their borders, Heymann writes: “For demo-
cratic nations, the primary concerns in dealing
with terrorism are to maintain and protect life, the
liberties necessary to a vibrant democracy, and the
unity of the society, the loss of which can turn a
healthy and diverse nation into a seriously divided
and violent one.”
According to Heymann, the greatest danger for a
democracy is that it may take self-destructive
actions in response to terrorism—precisely what
the terrorists want. In a recent paper on “Civil Lib-
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erties and Human Rights in the Aftermath of Sep-
tember 11th,” Heymann reasons: “The safest and
surest way of preventing a terrorist attack is to
monitor effectively every individual or group who
may possibly be planning such an attack. But the
result...is to expose large numbers of individuals
and groups who have no violent intentions to
monitoring because of some small chance that the
government may have overlooked the danger of the
group or individual. How dangerous that is
depends, in part, on how coercive or intrusive the
monitoring is.  But it will all be intrusive.”
“Intrusive monitoring” includes the use of inform-
ants to spy on political, religious, and other activist
groups, which “is always likely to create a substan-
tial inhibition of democratic political activity,” says
Heymann.  There are, in fact, notable recent exam-
ples of how these kinds of activities can diminish
the causes they are set in motion to serve.  FBI sur-
veillance of civil rights and antiwar groups, for
instance, caused bitter divisions in this country
during the tumultuous 1960s and eventually led to
restrictions on the agency’s tactics in spying on
U.S. citizens. Even after three decades, the Nixon
White House’s dispatching burglars to rifle the files
of Daniel Ellsberg’s psychiatrist in search of incrim-
inating evidence against the leaker of the Pentagon
Papers remains a painful memory for some. There
were further contretemps during the 1980s over
the government’s infiltration of liberal and left-
wing groups opposed, for example, to the Reagan
administration’s Latin American policies.
But what if law enforcement agencies have a rea-
sonably good idea of who, or what groups—such
as certain Muslim fundamentalist organizations—
they should be keeping an eye on?  Then it makes
sense to concentrate investigative resources on that
group “even if you know that…the number of
innocent members subjected to investigation or
denial of access...will vastly exceed the number of
legitimate suspects,” Heymann says. “But there is a
frightening long-term cost. Every member of the
class denied access or subjected to special investiga-
tion before being granted access will be made to
feel less than a full citizen of the United States or
less than a fully wanted visitor and that message
will be conveyed to all of the other citizens of that
country.”
An alternative is improving the capacity of U.S.
intelligence agencies to identify dangerous people
and to check expanded databases whenever some-
one seeks access to targets or resources that could
be used for a terrorist attack.  But that means the
government would be creating more dossiers and
checking them more often, which also has serious
civil liberties consequences, Heymann suggests.
He therefore concludes: “[T]he gravest danger to
civil liberties and human rights…in the aftermath
of September 11th is that our leaders will think we
are without courage; without concern for non-citi-
zens within the United States, and indifferent to
the welfare of citizens repressed by despotic govern-
ments; prepared to accept without question
unequal treatment based on ethnicity, and unable
or unwilling to see that there will and must be
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trade-offs among even our own freedoms and to
share in considering them carefully.”
Red Teaming
There are other methods that can be used to try to
predict and intercept terrorist activities.  One
missed opportunity that should serve as an impor-
tant lesson learned is that aviation security experts
might have foreseen the possibility of a September
11th hijack scenario if they had practiced the type
of war gaming that the military regularly engages
in to try to prepare for surprise attacks. Military
war gamers teach the importance of trying to stay a
jump ahead of the enemy through what is known
as red team/blue team exercises. In classrooms at
military colleges and in the field during exercises,
the red team plays the enemy and plots novel ways
to circumvent the blue team’s defenses. It was Red
Teaming that spurred the development of Stealth
fighter technology and other military advances.
Counter-surveillance is also imperative. As Carter
stresses, “You look out and see who’s looking at
you.” American embassies in sensitive locations
routinely do that, but in this electronic age, that
kind of proactive monitoring can also be carried
out via the Internet by noting who comes to par-
ticular web sites looking for information that
might be useful to someone trying to target a U.S.
facility or build a weapon. One way of doing this is
by setting up what’s called a “honey pot”—a web
site or network armed with software designed to
record and track visitors sniffing around for sensi-
tive information.  This approach is promising
enough, the Irish Times recently reported, that the
U.S. government has consulted with the Honeynet
Project, a prominent nonprofit group of security
professionals dedicated to information security
research.
But Who Will Guard the Guardians?
No matter how successful government or law
enforcement agencies may be in setting up more
effective surveillance of means, it is likely that
American citizens are going to experience infringe-
ments on the privacies and liberties they are used
to.  In fact, Hart predicts that if there is another
attack, the security precautions and inconveniences
that Americans now experience when they’re flying
will spill over into their daily lives. “It’ll be airport
security every day, going in and out of shopping
areas, supermarkets and so on.  And people will get
very irritated with it,” he says.  This is a cause for
concern to Christopher F. Edley, Jr., a member of
the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, who also
addressed the Carnegie Corporation meeting. He
wonders, for example, what the commission could
have done, had it existed in 1942, to prevent the
internment of Japanese Americans on, in Edley’s
characterization, “the flimsiest of national security
precautions.”  The Civil Rights Commission has
sought to uncover post-September 11th incidents
of bias against Americans of Arab descent and to
discourage racial profiling by law enforcement.
Edley points out that even before the September
attacks, the country was struggling to agree on
whether any kind of racial profiling, in any cir-
cumstances, was acceptable.  Now the question
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becomes even more pointed.  As Edley asks:
“What strategies will become acceptable in an anti-
terrorism context?  Will the methods used include
intensive surveillance of devout Muslims or of
graduate students who speak Arabic?  What about
sweeping hundreds of individuals from ‘suspect’
countries into detention centers—as happened
after September 11th—and then throwing up barri-
ers to their families, their attorneys and journalists
clamoring to know who was being held and why,
or even where? There is a crisis in legitimacy when
we don’t know the answers to those questions and
may be denied a voice in resolving them.”
Edley goes on to echo a question the Romans first
pondered: “Who will guard the guardians?  The
courts?  Perhaps, but don’t count on it. Korematsu
v. The United States*, surely one of the most
shameful decisions in the history of the Supreme
Court, has never been overruled.  That fact alone
should deflate our confidence that the courts will
stand as a bulwark against war-stoked passions that
bend liberties and reshape rights.”
Support for Edley’s viewpoint comes from William
H. Rehnquist, the chief justice of the U.S.
Supreme Court. In his absorbing and prescient
1998 book All the Laws But One: Civil Liberties in
Wartime (McKay, David, 1998) Rehnquist
recounts the history of the major legal battles
fought over the years in regard to civil liberties in
wartime. He quotes Francis Biddle, FDR’s Attor-
ney General who opposed the Japanese internment,
saying: “The Constitution has not greatly bothered
any wartime president.” Rehnquist says that apart
from the added authority that the law gives the
chief executive in time of war, presidents tend to
“push their legal authority to its outer limits, if not
beyond.” As for the courts, the chief justice adds:
“If the decision is made after hostilities have
ceased, it is more likely to favor civil liberty than if
made while hostilities continue.”
Edley’s proposal for creating a balance between the
potential pressure on civil liberties that might be
exerted by a wartime president and the mainte-
nance of an open democracy is to create a civic
oversight group to serve as a watchdog agency that
can bridge the divide between those who are
deeply involved in the fight against terrorism and
those who are equally concerned about oppression
and the violations of civil and human rights.  “We
need to create a mechanism so that people with
different points of view can sit together, look at the
problems day by day and, on behalf of the rest of
us, monitor what is going on behind closed doors,”
Edley says.
Preserving the Right to Debate
Finally, in the debate about security vs. the rights
of citizens in a democratic society, it is important
to note that the right to debate has, itself, recently
been called into question.  When some Adminis-
tration critics raised concerns about the speed with
which Congress rushed through the USA Patriot
Act (signed into law by President Bush on October
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* The decision that allowed for the internment of Japanese
Americans; see page 12.
26th, 2001) which, among other provisions,
expanded the FBI’s powers to conduct certain
kinds of surveillance without court orders, and
others objected to government suggestions that
captured Al-Qaeda fights might be brought before
military tribunals, Attorney General John Ashcroft
admonished them by calling their patriotism into
question.  Those who raised doubts about aspects
of the government’s war on terrorism were,
Ashcroft asserted, engaging in “fear mongering,”
and scaring people with “phantoms of lost liberty.”
Ashcroft said that such tactics “only aid terrorists,
for they erode our national unity and diminish our
resolve.”  He added that, “They give ammunition
to America’s enemies, and pause to America’s
friends. They encourage people of goodwill to
remain silent in the face of evil.”
“Actually, the reverse is true,” maintained John
Farmer, national political correspondent for The
Star-Ledger of Newark, New Jersey. “The people of
‘goodwill’ most likely to be silenced,” he stated,
“are those who believe Bush and Ashcroft have
overreached in their anti-terrorism
crusade…[Ashcroft’s] comments seemed designed to
instill fear in critics and shut down real debate.”
The editorial pages of newspapers across the nation
echoed similar statements; the lead op-ed piece in
the New York Times the following weekend even
made it clear that some took Ashcroft’s comments
as indicating that he considered opposing points of
view to be tantamount to treason.  Ashcroft soon
issued statements indicating that his remarks had
been misrepresented, and that he did want public
debate about security measures.  “What he does
not think is helpful to the country,” his spokesper-
son said, were  “misstatements and the spread of
misinformation about the actions of the Justice
Department,” giving examples that included using
the word “eavesdropping” to describe the monitor-
ing of some attorney-client conversations (involv-
ing those interred after September 11th because of
concerns that they might have had some connec-
tion to the terrorists), and those who have alleged
that interviews with more than 5,000 foreign visi-
tors, most of them from the Middle East, amount
to racial profiling.
However one interprets the attorney general’s
remarks, it is useful to remember that he is not the
first to have suggested that, in some circumstances,
there may be limits on Americans’ rights, including
the right of free speech.  As Supreme Court Justice
Robert Jackson famously remarked in 1949, in an
opinion dissenting to a decision in a free speech
case, “The Bill of Rights is not a suicide pact.”
Richard A. Posner, a U.S. Court of Appeals judge
and noted author, seems to agree: in December
2001 he wrote in the Atlantic Monthly that civil
libertarians “treat our existing civil liberties—free-
dom of the press, protections of privacy and of the
rights of criminal suspects and the rest—as sacro-
sanct…[but] this is a profoundly mistaken
approach to the question of balancing liberty and
security.  The basic mistake is the prioritizing of
liberty.”  Others, however, passionately defend not
only the right of citizens to speak out against
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encroachments on American freedoms but say
there is also a need to do so, and that our democra-
cy is strong enough to withstand not only terrorist
attacks but also vigorous public disagreement
about the ways in which the war on terror should
be conducted.
Debate about these issues—the balance between
security and civil rights; the need to improve our
ability to prevent terrorists from acquiring the tools
and materials with which to cause widespread
destruction; the kind of oversight that may be
necessitated by new national security proposals,
along with many other questions—will continue
for as long as the war on terrorism goes on and will
have implications for the shape of American
democracy for decades ahead.  Therefore, the voic-
es that must be raised, the opinions that must be
heard, should come from all of us: from our presi-
dent and elected representatives, surely, but also
from citizens, foundations, universities, organiza-
tions and institutions of every political persuasion
and representing the great diversity of this nation
which is, ultimately, its greatest strength.
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APPENDIX
Liberty, Security and U.S. History
Tension between liberty and security goes back to
the early days of the Republic: 
•  The Alien and Sedition Acts, passed by the Fed-
eralist Congress in 1798 during a time of fractured
relations with revolutionary France, allowed Presi-
dent John Adams to deport aliens and ban newspa-
pers that wrote “false, scandalous and malicious”
articles about the government. After Thomas Jef-
ferson led the Republicans to victory in 1800, the
unpopular statutes were repealed or allowed to sun-
set.
•  President Abraham Lincoln suspended habeas
corpus in the first tense weeks of the Civil War in
April 1861. When the Army jailed a Maryland
militia leader and suspected saboteur named John
Merryman, Chief Justice Roger Taney promptly
ordered Merryman released, but the president
ignored the order. In a message to Congress, Lin-
coln asked: “Are all the laws, but one, to go unexe-
cuted, and the government itself go to pieces, lest
that one be violated?”
•  In 1864 a military tribunal tried several Indiana
“copperheads”—Southern sympathizers—suspected
of plotting to raid federal arsenals and free Confed-
erate prisoners. Three were condemned to death,
although the sentences later were commuted. In
December 1866 the U.S. Supreme Court threw
out the conviction of one of the individuals, Lamb-
din Milligan, ruling that he should have been tried
in a civilian court. Justice David Davis wrote in Ex
Parte Milligan: “The Constitution of the United
States is a law for rulers and people, equally in war
and in peace, and covers with the shield of its pro-
tection all classes of men, at all times, and under all
circumstances.”
•  Eight alleged accomplices of John Wilkes Booth
were tried in a military court after the April 1865
assassination of Lincoln and attempt on the life of
Secretary of State William Seward. Four were
found guilty and hanged, including Mary Surratt,
who operated the boarding house where Booth and
his cronies met. Her guilt or innocence remains a
subject of historical debate. Mrs. Surratt’s lawyers
sought a writ of habeas corpus on the morning of
her execution, July 7, 1865. A District of Colum-
bia judge, Andrew Wylie, issued the writ, but
backed off after prosecutors showed him an order
from President Andrew Johnson suspending habeas
corpus.
•  The Espionage Act of 1917, passed during
World War I, gave President Woodrow Wilson the
power to censor books, newspapers or any publica-
tion “urging treason, insurrection, or forcible resist-
ance to any law of the United States.” Postmaster
General Albert Burleson refused to deliver antiwar
newspapers and magazines. Eugene V. Debs, five-
time Socialist candidate for president, was sent to
prison for a speech in support of draft resisters. A
string of anarchist bombings in eight cities
unnerved the nation in 1919. Attorney General A.
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Mitchell Palmer —whose home was struck by one
of the bombs—rounded up thousands of aliens
suspected of having Communist or anarchist sym-
pathies. Several hundred were deported to Russia.
Prominent lawyers decried Palmer’s tactics and
Palmer eventually lost public support.
•  Ten weeks after the Japanese attacked Pearl Har-
bor, President Franklin D. Roosevelt signed Execu-
tive Order 9066, allowing military commanders
“to prescribe military areas ... from which any or all
persons may be excluded.” The order did not single
out Japanese aliens, but it was the Issei (the genera-
tion of Japanese who left their country in the late
1800s to come to the U.S.) and their American-
born offspring, the Nissei, who were forced from
homes in California, Oregon and Washington and
moved to internment camps in March 1942.
•  The U.S. Supreme Court heard three challenges
to internment during World War II. In June 1943
it unanimously upheld the conviction of Ameri-
can-born Gordon Kiyoshi Hirabayashi, 24, a senior
at the University of Washington in Seattle, for a
curfew violation. Noting that the Constitution
gives the president and Congress the power to
wage war, the justices said, “it is not for any court
to sit in review of the wisdom of their action or
substitute its judgment for theirs.” Then in
December 1944 it voted 6-3 to uphold the intern-
ment of Fred Korematsu, 22, a welder born in
Oakland, California. In dissent, Justice Frank Mur-
phy said the majority ruling was based on an “erro-
neous assumption of racial guilt rather than bona
fide military necessity” and fell into “the abyss of
racism.” At the same time, the high court unani-
mously granted Mitsuye Endo, a motor vehicles
clerk from Sacramento, release from a Utah intern-
ment camp. The high court held that the War
Relocation Authority had no power to detain “citi-
zens who are concededly loyal.”
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